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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs I, Case No. 
. 10716 
ROY LEE POE, \ 
Def end ant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Roy Lee Poe, appeals from his 
conviction of M:URDEH IN THE FIRST DE-
GREE in Yiolation of Section 76-30-3, Utah Code 
1\nnotated, 1953, upon jury trial in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court of 'Vashington County, State of Utah. 
The Honorable C. Nelson Day presided, and the ap-
pclla11t was sentenced to be executed. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
The appellant was charged with the crime of 
murder in the first degree by information filed in the 
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 'V ashing-
ton County, State of Utah. He was arraigned on 
January 14, 1966, and a plea of not guilty was entered. 
Trial by jury was commenced on March 28, 196U, and 
concluded on April 1, 1966. After presentation of 
evidence the appellant was found guilty of murder in 
the first degree, and the jury having made no recom-
mendation for mercy, Judge C. Nelson Day enteml 
judgment upon the verdict, and sentenced the appellant 
to death by shooting at the Utah State Prison. The 
appellant was committed to the Utah State Prison 
on April 18, 1966, to await execution. On May 10, 
1966, Judge Day ordered a stay of execution pending 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant submits that the conviction should 
be reversed, and that a new trial be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The following is a summary of the evidence otf ered 
at trial. Kenneth Hall was fatally shot twice thro11gh 
the head by a firearm, presumably a .22 calibre ri!le 
(Tr. 441, 442). The deceased was discovered late in 
the afternoon of November 9, 1965, when Lelnrnl Hall, 
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bis brother, broke into the deceased's house in St. 
(;eorge, Utah (Tr. 328, 329, 331). He was found in 
a sleeping position, his arms crossed, one over the other 
oil the upper part of his body (Tr. 332). Leland Hall 
identified the body as that of his brother, Kenneth 
Hall, a long time resident of St. George (Tr. 325, 
3i31 ) . 
Ou the 10th day of November an investigation and 
searci. was conducted of the deceased's house and sur-
rounding premises. Lt. Clarence Evans, Salt Lake 
Count:; Sheriff's Office, testified that there were several 
tire tracks leading to the house, and that there were 
many footprints around the building itself. He further 
testified that even though he had the equipment, no 
ti11ger prints were taken (Tr. 400, 461). However, 
there were numerous photographs taken of the area 
around the house, the house, and of the deceased (Tr. 
-Hil). 
The body was removed from the house and taken 
to l'tah \ralley Hospital in Provo, Utah (Tr. 467, 
-tU8). There, Dr. 'Vilford Le Cheminant removed two 
fragments of metal from the deceased (Tr. 412, 413, 
-t H. 437, 438). These pieces of metal were later identi-
fied as rifle slugs by Richard J. Poppleton, a special 
11gent of the F. B. I. (Tr. 489, 492, 493). He stated 
that the two slugs had the same characteristics as some 
lnillcts which he tested from a .22 calible rifle that had 
b<:en loaned to the deceased and which was State's 
('\liibit :!8 (Tr. 491, 492, 493, 495, 496). 
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La Var Hall testified that he went to the residenee 
of Ken Hall, where the defendant, Roy Poe, was also 
living, on the afternoon of November 6, 1965. There 
he gave Ken Hall some money, about twenty-fin 
dollars, for a freezer (Tr. 513, 514, 516). Later that 
same afternoon Roy Poe and Ken Hall went to the 
O.K. Tire Store in St. George, Utah (Tr. 683). Eldon 
Hafen stated that Ken Hall came into the store alone 
to get a tire from him (Tr. 525). Mickey Clark testi-
fied that at that time he had a conversation with Roy 
Poe outside the tire shop (Tr. 684) . During the con-
versation Mr. Poe asked to borrow $10 so that he could 
visit his relatives in Las Vegas, Nevada (Tr. 685). 
Max "Tulfenstein testified that at approximately 
9 :30 p.m. November 6, 1965, both Roy Poe an<l Ken-
neth Hall were in the Sun Bowl Club, St. George, 
Utah, but neither saw the other (Tr. 542, 543, 544<). 
The witness stated that Ken Hall left the Club about 
10:00 p.m. with Irwin Pace (Tr. 545). According to 
the witness' testimony Roy Poe, the defendant, left 
the Club thirty minutes later (Tr. 546). Although the 
witness remembered seeing both Ken Hall and Roy 
Poe in his establishment several times before, he could 
not remember any of the other times or dates (Tr. 
546, 549, 550) . The only reason he could remember 
this particular time and date was because "the officers 
told him so". (Tr. 550, 551). 
Irwin Pace testified that Ken Hall gave him a ride 
in his 1957 Plymouth station wagon on Non:·mber fl. 
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HHi5. He further stated that Ken Hall dropped him 
off at IO :25 p.m. that night (Tr. 569, 570, 571, 573). 
At 11 :00 p.m. that same evening, Yern Phillips 
testified, Roy Poe was in the Sun Bowl Club (Tr. 590). 
r\ t that time the defendant, Roy Poe, sold him two 
rifles, one of which was a .22 calibre (Ex. 28) (Tr . 
.JUO, 1)0~). The witness then proceeded to give two con-
fiidillg statements as to what was said during the trans-
action (Tr. 600, 608, 609, 610, 611). He stated that 
the defendant, although acting calm and normal, told 
him that he had killed somebody (Tr. 600). Then 
Phillips admitted that he had previously testified at 
preliminary hearing that the defendant, acting calm 
mid normal, had said nothing other than that about 
the sale (Tr. 608, 609, 610, 611). 
David Holtz testified that Roy Poe drove a 1957 
Plymouth station wagon into his gas station on the 
outskirts of St. George, Utah, at 11 :30 p.m., November 
li, 1965 (Tr. 616, 617). 'Vhile Holtz filled the car with 
gas, he overheard Roy Poe say something about going 
to Las Yegas (Tr. 617, 620). Between 1:00 a.m. and 
2:00 a.m. November 7, 1965, Mary Miner saw Roy 
Puc iu )lesquite, Nevada, at the cafe where she worked 
(Tr. 636, 637). 
J erol<l Hickey testified that on November 12, 
HIG:3, he arrested Roy Poe in Las Y egas, Nevada (Tr. 
1;50). 
The following clay the defendant was transferred 
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from Las Yegas to St. George, Utah, by Sheriff 'Vhite-
head (Tr. 401, 402). 
There was substantial evidence that Poe had been 
drinking heavily on the night of November 6, Hlu5. 
The last witness who testified before the court was 
Delton Ray Nance (Tr. 710). He testified that he had 
been in the same cell with the defendant after Poe 
had been transferred to St. George, Utah (Tr. 711). 
The witness then testified to some conversations be-
tween Poe and himself in the '\T ashington County .Tail 
on November 15, 1965 (Tr. 712, 713, 714, 716). The 
witness and Poe were reading some mystery stories 
from detective magazines that Nance had bought at the 
store for the defendant (Tr. 712, 716). Nance testi-
fied that Poe said that if it ever happened again, it 
would be worth a lot of money, $50,000 or $60,000 
so that he would be able to fight the case (Tr. 71:2, 
713). The witness then said that Poe had planned to 
go to Old Mexico (Tr. 713, 714). However, on cross-
examination the witness stated that the defendant said 
he had abandoned the 1957 Plymouth in Las Vegas 
(Tr. 723). 
Nance further testified that he had been put on 
probation in connection with the offense for which 
he was being held at the time the defendant was 
in jail (Tr. 723, 724). After a brief re-direct exa1ni-
nation both counsel indicated that they had no furthn 
questions for the witness (Tr. 725). At this time the 
Judge commenced to give his own testimon~' as to the 
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credibility of the witness. He testified that Nance was 
placed on probation by the same court for which he 
,, as now testifying. The Judge also stated that Nance 
presumably reported to his probation officer regularly 
;:11d complied with any other requirement which had 
been set by the court (Tr. 726) . The Judge further 
commented that he knew nothing of the connection 
between Nance and Roy Poe until the witness gave his 
testimony at the trial (Tr. 726). 
During the trial the prosecution introduced several 
gruesome pictures of the deceased. Some of the ex-
hibits were used to establish the deceased's identity, 
his death and the cause of death; the cause of death 
was never in dispute. (Tr. 362, 379, 380, 382). Follow-
ing the introduction of seYeral black and white photo-
graphs of the deceased and his home, seven grotesque 
l'olor slides of the autopsy of the deceased were ad-
mitted into evidence (Tr. 429). These color slides 
depicted the head, neck and shoulders of the deceased 
after the autopsy had removed a section of his skull 
and peeled his skin back over his head, exposing the 
brain cavity (Tr. 416, 421, 426). These "shock-
ing" exhibits were displayed to the jury by means of 
a slide projector along with a living narration from 
the autopsy surgeon, Dr. Le Cheminant (Tr. 436-
HO). All over the objection of the defense. There 
was 110 dispute that the deceased had been shot twice 
in the head and died from the wounds. These photo-
graphs were unrelated to the cnlpability of the accused 
if "'t1iltv and were sickening and inflammatory. 
h • 
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FACTS RELATIYE TO THE COl\tlPOSITION 
OF JURY 
The follownig facts are presented for the purpose 
of showing the general composition of the jury, and 
more specifically the proximity of the relationships 
which existed between the members of the jury and wit-
nesses for the prosecution, the victim, the prosecutors, 
and the defendant. Additional facts are presented rela-
tive to pre-trial opinions held or expressed by the jurors, 
along with any discussons with jurors or other exposure 
of the jury to the purported facts of the case. 
ACQUAINTED vVITH 'VITNESSES FOR 
THE PROSECUTION: 
The record reflects that Evan G. Whitehead, Sheriff 
of 'Vashington County, was personally known by every 
member of the jury (Tr. 154). 
The record does not show just which members of 
the jury were acquainted with George Andrus, Deputy 
Sheriff of Washington County, but when Judge Day 
asked how many knew Deputy Andrus, he commented, 
"Well, all of you, almost all" (Tr. 155). 
Witness Elba Owen Clark was known by five 
members of the jury, (Tr. 176, 180, 181, 183, 184), 
and witness Irwin Pace was acquainted with six mem-
bers of the jury (Tr. 203, 205, 206, 209, 210). 
Witness Eldon Hafen was acquainted with every 
member of the jury (Tr. 211). In addition to knowing 
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all of the jurors he was related to two of them (Tr. 
211, 213). Juror Snow was a third or fourth cousin 
;:o Mr. Hafen (Tr. 213) and Juror Adams was a third 
rnusin to Mr. Hafen (Tr. 213). Also, in addition 
b .Juror Snow being l\Ir. Hafen's third cousin, the 
wives of Juror Snow and Mr. Hafen are sisters (Tr. 
211). 
\Vitness D. Kline Adams was known by ten of the 
twefre jurors (Tr. 235, 236, 240, 241, 243, 245, 246), 
and one of the jurors, Mr. Talbot, was at the time of 
the trial, transacting business with Mr. Adams (Tr. 
2-1<5). 
It is not certain how many jurors were acquainted 
with witness Jake Milne (Tr. 249), but it was more 
than three (Tr. 247, 24'8, 24'9). One of the jurors, Mr. 
\Vehb, 'vas his first cousin (Tr. 247) and the wife of 
.Juror Stanworth was also a first cousin to Mr. Milne 
(Tr.248). 
\Yitness Jay Ence was known by two jurors, (Tr. 
250-252) , one of them being Kay Ence, his first cousin 
(Tr. 250). 
Witness Scott Prisbury was known by two jurors, 
~Ir. Stanworth (Tr. 257) and Mr. Thompson (Tr. 
253). Both of these jurors were building contractors 
aml Mr. Prisbury was a building inspector (Tr. 225, 
2;i7). As a result of his job Mr. Prisbury had direct 
::11<1 mnstant personal contact with these jurors prior 
to the trial (Tr. 255, 257). 
9 
Several jurors knew witness, Vern Phillips, but 
the record does not disclose just how many or which 
jurors (Tr. 258). 
All of the jurors knew Donald Best, of the Utah 
Highway Patrol (Tr. 259) and Juror Adams was a 
cousin to the wife of Trooper Best (Tr. 258). 
Several of the jurors were acquainted with witness 
LeGrande Spillsbury (Tr. 263), and witness Max 
Wulffenstein was known by Juror Adams (Tr. 173). 
Also, of extreme importance is the fact that many 
of the jurors knew the deceased's brother. (See infra 
p. IO, II). 
ACQUAINTED \VITH DECEASED AND HIS 
BROTHER: 
Of the twelve members of the jury, six of them 
were personally acquainted with the deceased, l\Ir. Ke11 
Hall. (Tr. 137, 141, 149, 151, 222). Of these six jurors, 
one of them, Mr. Thompson, commented as follows: 
"I was a next door neighbor to him for a period 
of time that he lived out at the feed store and 
I have known him for, oh, 16 years. Some busi-
ness and just a friendly acquaintance." (Tr. 
137). 
Mr. Stanworth, another juror, testified of Ken Hall 
that: "He was married to my cousin at one time" ('fr. 
150). 
Leland Hall, who was the brother of Ken Ilall 
and also a witness for the prosecution, was knmrn h~ 
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either four or five members of the jury (Tr. IG4, Hiti, 
1G8, 170, 171). The record of the trial was not exactly 
clear on just how many jurors knew him. 
AC(-lUAINTED \VITH PROSECUTORS: 
The record shows that of the twelve members of 
the jury, nine of them were personally acquainted 
with ~Ir. Phillip Lang Foremaster, 'Vashington County 
Attorney, (Tr. 69, 73, 77, 79, 80, 81, 133), and five of 
them were personally acquainted with _Mr. J. Harlan 
limns, District Attorney, Fifth Judicial District (Tr. 
li9, 7H, 76, 79, 80). Three of these jurors were ac-
quainted with counsel as a result of an attorney-client 
relationship (Tr. 69, 77, 80), and one of these three 
jurors, l\Ir. Kay Ence, said of l\Ir. Foremaster: "'Vell, 
we go to him for our legal work if we have any ... " 
(Tr. 77). l\Ir. Ence also said he would be going to Mr. 
Foremaster for legal work "within the next, probably, 
eouple of weeks ... " (Tr. 77). 
l\Ir. Talbot, another juror, indicated that he and 
Ur. Foremaster were neighbors (Tr. 79), and Jurors 
Graff and 'Vebb were jurors in another case where _l\Ir. 
Hurns was counsel for one of the parties (Tr. 76, 79). 
Also, .T uror Snow, had served as a witness for one 
of l\lr. Burns' clients in prior litigation (Tr. 73). 
AC(~(TAINTED \VITH DEFENDANT: 
The record indieates that +he defendant, Roy Lee 
Po<', \\'as eompletely unknown by eyery member of 
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the jury (Tr. 40, 132). In fact, of all the jurors and 
potential jurors only one person was acquainted with 
Mr. Poe (Tr. 40). Comparing this fact to the general 
acquaintanceships which existed among the members 
of the community, as expressed by the record in this 
case, it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Poe was a 
virtual stranger to the people of St. George. 
PRE-TRIAL OPINIONS, DISCUSSIONS AND 
EXPOSURE TO PURPORTED FACTS: 
Judge C. Nelson Day noted for the record that 
"practically all" of the potential jurors had "read about 
or heard about what purported to be the facts of this 
matter ... " (Tr. 25). 
Judge Day also noted that "several of you have" 
formed or expressed an opinion about what purports 
to be the facts in this case (Tr. 25). In his subsequent 
voir dire of the potential jurors, Judge Day did not 
inquire on an individual basis as to each juror's pre-
trial exposure to the purported facts of the case. He 
restricted his interrogation to the question of whether 
or not the jurors had formed or expressed an opinion 
as to the purported facts. 
Out of the twelve jurors who actually served. ten 
of them said they had not formed or expressed an opin-
ion (Tr. 26, 28, 31, 36, 37, 40). One juror, l\Ir. Holt, 
said, "I've (sic) expressed an opinion when it first hap-
pened, but I still think I could go ... " (Tr. :37) · 
The twelfth juror, Mr. Thompson, was not even 
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a~,kecl whether or not he had formed or expressed an 
opiuion (Tr. 131, start of interrogation). 
l, 1\ CTS-COMJHUNITY ATTITUDES AND 
P:E.RSONS CALLED FOR JURY SERVICE 
St. George is a relatively small town with a popu-
lation of approximately .5,130 with 'Vashington County 
as a whole having a population of approximately 
10,271. 
Even though Judge Day made an attempt to keep 
potential jurors from giving their opinions or discuss-
i11g the crime, the following excerpts from the trial 
record will show that a community pattern of thought 
had developed as to the facts of this case. 
'Vhen Judge Day asked which of the jurors had 
read or heard about what purported to be the facts in 
the matter before the court, he replied to his own ques-
tion, "'Vell, I would say practically all of you have" 
(Tr. 2.5). He then asked "but have you formed or ex-
pressed an opinion about ·what purports to be the facts 
in this case, any of you?" To this question he again re-
plied. "'V ell, several of you have. I think the thing to 
do is to go down through the list" (Tr. 25). 
Out of the 51 veniremen called, 47 of them were 
asked if they had formed or expressed an opinion as 
to the facts of the case. Out of these 47 veniremen, 12 
of them (or 2.5.5S~,) admitted having preconceived 
opinions, and of those l?., there were 7 veniremen ex-
cust>d because they could not set aside their opinions 
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in rendering an impartial decision (Tr. 27, 28, 31, 33, 
35, 37, 67, 108, 124, 128, 224). 
The voir dire of potential jurors Cottam and Mathis 
brought out additional elements of community thought 
on the subject. Mr. Cottam, when asked if he had 
formed or expressed an opinion on the facts of the 
case said "Nothing more than a casual comment that 
most citizens in town ... " (Tr. 39). :Mr. Mathis, in 
attempting to express his own uncertainty as to bias 
or prejudice said, ''I think I'm in the position of a 
lot of others of having discussed this ... " (Tr. 123). 
Both of these jurors indicated the presence of com-
munity feeling on this subject. 
Venireman Leany admitted having an opinion, and 
when asked if that opinion would prevent him from 
basing his verdict solely upon the evidence, he replied 
to the Judge and in the presence of the other jurors, 
"'V ell, I'd try to look at it that way; but the other may 
influence me. It is bound to, what I have heard" (Tr. 
28). 
Venireman Beatty said he knew Ken Hall and 
that he had formed or expressed an opinion prior to 
coming into court. V\Then asked if his opinion woul<l 
preclude him from thoroughly and impartially deter-
mining the issues in this case, he said to the judge and 
in the presence of the potential jurors, "I am afraid it 
would. My mind is pretty well made up" ('fr. 35). 
Juror 'V oodbury was excused by the court because 
of opinions formed or expressed (Tr. 3o). 
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.;)Ir. YVells had formed an opinoin and when asked 
if there was any question in his mind as to whether or 
uot he could render his verdict without bias or preju-
dice, he said: "'Vell, I figured he was guilty right 
along" (Tr. 109). 
lloth .Juror 'Vells and .Mathis were excused when 
they admitted that their opinions were such that the 
burden would be on the defense to prove that their 
opinions were wrong (Tr. 124). 
Another indication of the climate of the commu-
llity prejudice was evidenced by the comments of :Mrs. 
Reichmann when she said: 
"I am not giving an opinion, but my husband 
is a doctor and while he was not called to examine 
Mr. Hall, I happened in the hospital when the 
doctors were discussing it, and I heard all the 
assorted details of it." (Tr. 128-129). 
l\Irs. Heichmann then went on to say that she had a 
wry strong opinion in the case and that she would be 
biased and prejudiced (Tr. 129). 
During the actual trial there was testimony indi-
cating that Poe was looked upon by the community 
as being somewhat of an undesirable person. This was 
lirought out on the examination of Elba Owen Clark, 
wherein l\lr. Clark, in ref erring to the defendant, said, 
""Tell, the fellows that I went with used to call him 
Third J\Ian Alcatraz. 'Vhen Pickett's store was broke 
in previously to this, we used to tease Roy about doing 
it ... " (Tr. 687). 
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It is common knowledge that an attorney may be 
subjected to undue criticism by defending an accused 
in an action which is unpopular within the community. 
In this connection, it is important to note that Judge 
Day may have been aware of such an attitude when 
he made the following statement: 
"Mr. lVIorris is not a party to this action, 
neither is Mr. Pickett nor neither of the attorneys 
representing the State. As a matter of fact, l\Ir. 
Pickett and :Mr. Morris are court appointed 
counsel. They didn't ask for this assignment, yet 
in the high tradition of the members of the :Bar 
of the State they willingly and with good grace 
assumed the defense of the defendant and thev 
are men of great capability in the courtroom.'" 
(Tr. 194). 
It should also be noted that of the 51 vemremen 
called, 37 were asked if they were acquainted with 
counsel for the State. Of those 37 there were 32 that 
admitted being acquainted in some degree, to either 
one or both of the prosecuting attorneys. 
As to those veniremen asked about being acquainted 
with Ken Hall (the victim) at least 16 stated they 
were acquainted with him. Also 12 of the veniremen 
were acquainted with Leland Hall, the brother of the 
victim and a material witness for the State. 
The defendant, however, was known by only one 
of the veniremen (Tr. 40), and that venireman was not 
on the actual jury, but was eliminated by a pre-emptory 
challenge. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJ-
CDICIAL ERROR BY ALLO,VING SHERIFF 
E\'AN G. 'VHITEHEAD TO BE SWORN AS 
BAILIFF AND TAKE CUSTODY OF THE 
JCllY DURING THEIR DELIBERATIONS 
Af'TER HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED 
AS A 'VITNESS, THEREBY DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF LA'V UN-
DEH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES AMENDMENT XIV. 
Just prior to the jury deliberating its verdict, 
Sheriff Evan G. Whitehead was sworn in as bailiff 
lo take custody of the jury during deliberation (Tr. 
765, 766). Sheriff 'Vhitehead was one of the chief wit-
nesses for the prosecution (Tr. 37 4, 403), and was per-
sonally acquainted with every member of the jury (Tr. 
154<). Because of the relationship of the sheriff to the 
jury, as a witness for the prosecution, sheriff, friend 
and bailiff, there existed a state of inherent prejudice 
of the most extreme kind, and in a comparable case 
Supreme Court of the United States found such a 
situation sufficient to merit a reversal of a decision 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Turner v. Louisiana, 
am U.S . .t.66 ( 1965), which had affirmed a Louisiana 
trial court conviction and sentence. State v. Turner, 
244. La. -U7, 152 So. 2d 555 (1963). The United States 
Supreme Court reversed finding a violation of the due 
pro('ess clause of the federal constitution. 
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In Turner v. Louisiana, supra, the two principal 
witnesses for the prosecution at the trial were also 
deputy sheriffs in the county in which the crime was 
committed. During the course of the trial the members 
of the jury were sequestered in accordance with Louisi-
ana law, and were thereby placed in the custody of the 
sheriff. As a result of this custodial relationship the 
sheriff's deputies including the two principal witnesses 
were in close and continual association with the jurors. 
'Vheu the defendant appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana, State v. Turner, supra, that court 
affirmed the conviction of the trial court. In support 
of the trial court judgment it said: 
"As we have pointed out, under the jurispru-
dence of this Court unless there is a showing of 
prejudice, a conviction will not be set aside 
simply because officers who are witnesses in the 
case have the jury under their charge. This court 
is inclined to look upon the practice with dis-
approval, however, because in such cases there 
may be prejudice of a kind exceedingly difficult 
to establish ... " State v. Turner supra, at 557. 
The Louisiana Court did recognize that "there 
may be prejudice of a kind exceedingly difficult to 
establish," but they were unwilling to reverse the trial 
court without an actual showing of prejudice. 
When this question was presented to the United 
States Supreme Court, 1,urner v. Louisio11(/, supro, 
that Court was unwilling to go along with the rcq11ire-
ment of showing actual prejudice and reversed Ilic 
18 
judgment before it. "Tith respect to the question of 
adual or implied prejudice the Court said in Turner 
r. Louisiana, supra, at 473: 
"And even if it could be assumed that the dep-
uties never did discuss the case directly with any 
members of the jury, it would be blinking real-
ity, not to recognize the extreme prejudice in-
herent in this continual association throughout 
the trial between the jurors and these two key 
witnesses for the prosecution." 
In connection with the issue presented in Turner 
v. Louisiana, supra, the Court took occasion to reiterate 
its feelings on the basic guarantees of trial by jury as 
previously stated in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, at 
722: 
"In essence, the right to j~iry trial guarantees 
to the criminally accused a fair trial by a pane1 
of impartial, indifferent jurors. The failure to 
accord an accused a fair hearing violates even 
the minimal standard of due process." 
The Court then went on to say, at page 473: 
"'Vhat happened in this case operated to sub-
vert these basic guarantees of trial by jury." 
In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, at 562, the Court 
again emphasized the importance of "inherent preju-
dice" as opposed to "actual prejudice" when it said, 
in relation to the Turner v. Lo1tisia11a, decision 
"The Supreme Court of Louisiana criticized 
the practice but said that in the absence of a 
showing of prej nice there was no grounds for 
19 
reversal. 'Ve reversed because the 'extreme prej-
udice inherent' in the practice required its con-
demnation on constitutional grounds." 
The 'Visconsin Supreme Court has also ruled on 
this question as evidenced from the following passage 
in Cullen v. State, 26 \Vis. 2d 652, 133 N.W. 2d 284 
' at 285 (1965): 
"There are several decisions in this state which 
make it clear that the practice of permitting a 
prosecution witness to act as jury bailiff is im-
proper even in the absence of proof of actual or 
attempted influence upon the jury. State v. Cot-
ter ( 1952) 262 \Vis. 168, 54 N.,V. 2d 43, 41 
A.L.R. 2d 222; Surma v. State ( 1952) 260 'Vis. 
510, 51 N.\V. 2d 47. See also La Valley v. State 
(1925), 188 'Vis. 68, 205 N.\V. 412." 
In State v. Cotter, 262 'Vis. 168, 54 N.,V. 2d 43 
( 1952), the defendant was convicted of assault with 
intent to do great bodily harm. 'Vhile the jury was de-
liberating its verdict the sheriff, who was appointed 
bailiff, was seen going into the jury room, and when 
questioned about it he said he merely told the jurors 
that it would not hurt his feelings if they hurried. 
The \Visconsin Court found this to be sufficient grounds 
for reversal, and they remanded for a new trial. In 
reversing the court said : 
"Even though no prejudice was shown ancl 
eyen though the instructions by the trial judge 
would tend to eliminate prejudice, if any in f ~ct 
existed, a trial must be free not only from pre.1u-
dice, but from the appearance thereof, and the 
rule must be adhered to in this case." 
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It should also be noted that the sheriff was not even 
a witness for the prosecution. The court found sufficient 
grounds to reverse merely upon there being an un-
authorized communication with the jury. 
In what is apparently the Supreme Court's latest 
opinion 011 this subject, the Court again recognized the 
importance of preventing potential prejudice, when 
they stated in Parker v. Gladden, 87 Sup. Ct. 486, 
at 470 (1966): 
"The State suggests that no prejudice was 
shown and that no harm could have resulted be-
cause 10 members of the jury testified that they 
had not heard the bailiff's statements and that 
Oregon law permits a verdict of guilty by 10 
affirmative votes. This overlooks the fact that the 
official character of the bailiff as an officer of the 
court as well as the State-beyond question car-
ries great weight with a jury which he had been 
shepherding for eight days and nights." (Em-
phasis added) . 
The court reversed a state court conviction. 
UTAH POSITION: 
In addition to considering the foregoing opinions 
by the United States Supreme Court, and other state 
Pourts, it is of utmost importance to recognize that this 
specific issue has been before the Utah Supreme Court 
on several occasions. State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 
237 Pac. 941 (1925); State v. Crank et al, 105 Utah 
332. U2 P. 2d 178 ( 1943). These cases favor the posi-
tion argued by appellant, and will be discussed in the 
above referenced order. 
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There also exist two additional Utah cases that 
may initially appear to stand contra to appellant's 
position, but upon close examination are distinguish-
able. State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 Pac. 1065 
(1924). State v. lticNaughton, 92 Utah 99, 58 P. 2d 
5 (1936). 
In State v. Anderson, supra, the defendant was 
convicted of grand larceny in connection with the theft 
of certain sheep. The trial lasted approximately three 
weeks. After the verdict had been read it was dis-
covered that almost every day during the trial one of 
the jurors had ridden back and forth from his home to 
the courthouse with one of the witnesses for the prose-
cution. The witness was one of the persons from whom 
the sheep had been stolen. 
Based upon the relationship between witness and 
juror the court reversed the judgment and remanded 
the case to the district court ·with directions to grant 
a new trial. In so doing, the court said, at 423: 
"But, as we view the record in this case, the 
appellant was denied a constitutional right to 
be tried and convicted, if convicted, by an im-
partial jury, as that term is used in the Consti-
tution and is construed by courts." 
It is extremely important to note that in State r. 
Anderson, supra, the court did NOT require an actual 
showing of bias or attempted influence, but based its 
decision upon the inherent bias or influence which may 
have been present. This point is emphasized in the 
following quotations from the court's opm10n: 
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"It is true that in this case the juror, as well 
as the witness, in their affidavits, affirm that no 
reference was made to the case during their trips 
back and forth. 
"'Ve may absolve the witness Sevy from in 
any way attempting to influence the juror by 
the courtesy shown him, and likewise concede 
that the juror was not consciously affected in 
rendering his verdict by the favors which he had 
received; but, in our judgment, such conduct 
cannot and ought not be a.I>proved, or a verdict 
rendered in such circumstances allowed to stand." 
In State v. Crank, supra, the defendant was con-
victed of murder in the second degree. The relation-
ship between the witness and juror was set out in the 
opinion as follows: 
"Defendants complaint of misconduct of the 
jury, in that Juror Dan Hayes was in conver-
sation with the witness Ashcroft, immediately 
prior to the submission of the case to the jur):. 
It is stated in the affidavit of Juror Hayes that 
he was merely renewing an old friendship with 
the witness." 
The court then reviewed the probable innocent 
nature of the conversation, but then went on to say: 
"In spite of these extenuating circumstances, 
this conduct is certainly improper, and is to be 
condemned bv the Court, PARTICULARLY 
IN CAPITAL CASES, where the life or lib-
erty of the defendant is at stake. In such in-
stai-ices, the verdict of the jury, like Caesar's 
wife, must be above su.~picion. In the instant 
case, since a new trial must be granted on other 
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grounds, we need not determine whether such 
conduct would alone be grounds for a new trial. 
"The judgment is reversed and the cause re-
manded for a new trial.'' 
This court's concern with keeping the jury above 
suspicion is parallel to the interests of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, as expressed in State v. Cotter, supra, 
in keeping the jury free from the appearance of preju-
dice. Also, the opinions of the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Anderson, supra, and State v. Crank, supra, 
are in full agreement with the opinion of the United 
States Supreme Court, as expressed in Turner v. Loui-
siana, supra. 
In State v. Lanos, supra, the defendant was con-
victed of forging a check which was presented and 
paid by a bank. During the trial one of the jurors said 
that he was employed by a company that maintained 
its account at the bank. The juror did not maintain his 
personal account at the bank, but it was still unclear 
whether or not there may have been a debtor-creditor 
relationship, apparently resulting from his employer 
having an account there. If there had been a debtor-
creditor relationship, there would have been grounds 
to challenge for cause under Comp. Laws Utah 1917 
§ 8954, (§77-30-19(2) U.C.A., 1953), but for such a 
challenge to be made "of right" it must have been made 
prior to the time that the jury was sworn Comp. Laws 
Utah 1917, § 8948 (§77-30-13 UCA, 1953). 'Vhereas, 
this relationship was not disclosed until the trial was 
in progress, the dismissal of the juror was at the dis-
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cretion of the judge, and the court determined that the 
relationship was so remote that the judge did not abuse 
his discretion. 
The Lanos case can be distinguished from the case 
at bar, based upon the remoteness of relationship and 
the severity of the sentence. Also, every juror knew 
the sheriff. Even in the Lanos case, when the relation-
ship was admitted very remote, the court may have 
reversed if the defendant had been sentenced to face 
the firing squad as has the appellant in this case. Also 
the differences of degree in relationship of the parties 
in the Lanos case and the instant case is so extreme 
that the two cases cannot be compared. Further the 
other many relationships between the various witnesses, 
the sheriff, and the jurors make it manifest this case 
is substantially more aggravated. 
In State v. McNaughton, supra, the court held that 
there was not sufficient ground to declare a mistrial 
when it was discovered that two of the jurors shook 
bands with a witness for the prosecution as they filed 
out of the courtroom. There was also evidence that one 
of the jurors was indebted to the same witness. 
As to the debtor-creditor relationship the court 
relied upon its opinion in State v. Lanos, supra. 
The McNaughton case can also be distinguished 
upon the remoteness of relationship, the extent of in-
rnlvcmcnt and degree of sentence. In the McN augh-
ton case the defendant was convicted of changing 
the brand on six sheep with the intent of stealing them. 
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"\Vhereas, the court did not find the handshake or the 
debtor-creditor relationship sufficient to declare a mis-
trial, the inference is that it would have if the defend-
ant's life was at stake, as in fact it is in the case at bar. 
Therefore, the Utah precedent on the issue of 
whether the challenged conduct was prejudicial in this 
case would support reversal. Also, due process 
under the Federal Constitution clearly requires reversal 
even in the absence of specific prejudice. 
The record of the trial did not disclose an actual 
attempt by Sheriff "\Vhitehead to use his position of 
bailiff to influence the jury, and whereas appellant's 
argument is based upon an "inherent prejudice' 'as 
opposed to an actual showing of prejudice, respondent 
may contend that "inherent prejudice" is insufficient 
grounds for reversal. In support of their argument 
they may rely upon this court's language in State v. 
Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P. 2d 655 (1966), 
wherein this court said: 
"There should be no dismissal of a charge, nor 
reversal of a judgment, unless there was a sig-
nificant failure or abuse of due process of law, 
or unless there was an error or defect which it 
could reasonably be supposed put the defendant 
at some substantial disadvantage, or had some 
substantial prejudicial effect upon his rights." 
In reply to this appellant would again reiterate 
the holding of the United States Supreme Court in 
Turner v. Louisiana, supra, wherein that court took 
the position that an abuse such as was present in the 
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rnse at bar would be a violation of the minimal stand-
ards of due process under the XIVth Amendment. 
Also we \vould refer again to the position of the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Anderson, supra, and State 
'l'. Crank et al., supra, wherein the court express the 
importance of keeping the jury above suspicion. Also 
in the Seymour case this Court held that if there were 
a reasonable supposition that a defendant would be 
put at a disadvantage, reversal would be required. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, this court, 
an<l the highest courts of other states have found such 
a reasonable supposition under like circumstances in 
other cases. 
A review of Sheriff 'Vhitehead's activities as both 
an investigator and witness for the prosecution, plus his 
general familiarity with the members of the jury will 
show that his appointment as bailiff was prejudicial 
error, sufficient to reverse the trial court judgment. 
Sheriff 'Vhitehead was known by every member 
of the jury (Tr. 154), and was active in community 
affairs, as evidenced by his participation iu projects 
sponsored by the local Lions Club (Tr. 154). He was 
personally acquainted with Mr. Ken Hall (the victim), 
and in fact had known Mr. Hall "practically all of my 
life". (Tr. 37 4) . The sheriff was not, however, ac-
quainted with the appellant, Mr. Poe. They were in 
fact, complete strangers until the 13th of November, 
HW5, when Sheriff 'Vhitehead picked Mr. Poe up m 
Las Yegas (Tr. 410). 
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As Sheriff of 'V ashington County he was in charge 
of the entire investigation. He was first to arrive at 
the scene of the crime, after it had been discovered by 
the victim's brother (Tr. 375). He received from Yer;1 
Phillips what is assumed to have been the murder 
weapon (Tr. 604). He made a thorough search of the 
Hall residence (Tr. 391), witnessing the condition 
of the body, the presence of the victim's wallet, ex-
pended .22 shells about the outside of the premises, 
and the odor which was present throughout the house; 
all of the investigatory activities of the sheriff were 
part of his testimony. 
After a review of the record (Tr. 37 4-409), there 
can be no question as to Sheriff 'Vhitehead's prominent 
position as investigator and witness. 
Sheriff "Thitehead was sworn in as bailiff just 
prior to the jury retiring to deliberate its verdict (Tr. 
765-766). After the Sheriff was sworn as bailiff, the 
Judge dismissed the alternate juror and said, "The 
rest of you are in the custody of the Sheriff here ... " 
(Tr. 766). He then went on to say "Sheriff, they're all 
yours." 
The record does not show whether or not the Sheriff 
thereafter had an occasion to discuss the case with the 
jurors. Nor does the record show that the jurors were 
taken out of the court, in the custody of the Sheriff. 
for the purpose of having lunch. I-Iowever, the recorrl 
does disclose that court was convened at 10 :00 a.m. 
on April l, (Tr. 730) that the .JllrY retired at 12 :-1.J 
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p.m. (Tr. 766), and that they did not reach a verdict 
until 4 :05 p.m. (Tr. 767). Therefore, a reasonable 
inference can be drawn that the jurors were in the cus-
tody of the sheriff for one meal. 
The history of the jury system reveals cases where 
the court has found it proper to lock its jurors up with-
out food or water until such time as they have reached 
a verdict. This is a sin of which the appellant does not 
belien the trial court was guilty. It is in fact very 
probable that the jury was either taken out to eat or, 
it had lunch brought in to it. In either event the Sheriff 
would have had direct contact with the jurors of the 
\·ery type which the Supreme Court feared in Turner 
t 1• Louisiana, supra. 
The Court's primary fear as expressed in Turner 
r. Louisiana, supra, was an undermining of the basic 
guarantees of trial by jury, resulting from the asso-
ciation between the jurors and two key prosecution 
witnesses. in this respect they stated at 474: 
"For the relationship was one which could not 
but foster the jurors' confidence in those who 
were their official guardians during the entire 
period of the trial." 
As the record of the trial demonstrates, Sheriff 
Evan G. 'Vhitehead was in a position to foster the 
('011fidence of the jurors. He also had a vast personal 
knowledge of the facts surrounding this case. The com-
bination of his personal knowledge of the facts, the 
eontidence the Jury obviously had in his personal 
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judgment, and his access to the jury as bailiff during 
the very critical period of deliberation, are the very 
factors which caused the Supreme Court to reverse in 
Turner 'L'. Louisiana, supra. It seems inescapable, that 
in this case, where the jury returned the maximum 
sentence in a case that was not extraordinary, that this 
court must reverse. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT \VAS DENIED A FAIR 
TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE COMMU-
NITY PATTERN OF THOUGHT AS EX-
PRESSED HY THE POTENTIAL JUR-
ORS, AND AS A RESCLT OF THE PROXIM-
ITY OF RELATIONSHIPS \VHICH EXIST-
ED BET\VEEN l\IE~\IBERS OF THE JURY 
AND \VITNESSES FOR THE PROSECC-
TION, THE VICTil\I, THE PROSECUTOHS 
AND THE DEFENDANT. 
The facts as reflected in the record and as com-
mented on in a preceding section, when examined in 
conjunction with the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 ( 1961). 
show that under the standards set by that court, the 
defendant was denied his rights to a fair trial. 
The test established in Irvin V. Dowd, supra, is 
not that a juror must be completely void of any pre-
conceived notions, as they felt that would be an im-
possible standard. The court's opinion was that: 
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"It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his 
impressions or opinions and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court." (At. 
p. 723). 
However, the court went on to say: 
"The adoption of such a rule, however, cannot 
foreclose inquiry as to whether, in a given case, 
the application of that rule works a deprivation 
of the prisoner's life or liberty without due pro-
cess of law. Lisemba Y. California, 314 U.S. 
219, 236. As stated in Reynolds, the test is 
'whether the nature and strength of the opinion 
formed are such as in law necessarily ... raise 
the presumption of partiality'." (At ·page 723). 
As to the impartiality of jurors the court recog-
nized that the determination of such a state of mind 
was uot an easy determination to make and in this con-
nection they cited Chief Justice Hughes in United 
States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-146 ( 1936), as say-
mg: 
"Impartiality is not a technical conception. 
It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of 
this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, 
the Constitution lays down no particular tests 
and procedure is not chained to any ancient and 
artificial formula." 
In Irwin v. Dowd, supra, the crime was somewhat 
more spectacular. It involved six murders, plus pub-
lication in the newspapers that the defendant had con-
frssed, but as to the points here in question there is 
a remarkable similarity between Irvin v. Dowd, and the 
instant case. The following factors are comparable 
between the cases: 
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a) In the Irvin case the trial was held in a small 
community (Gibson County-population 30,000). Iu 
the case at bar the trial was held in a small commu-
nity ('Vashington County-population approximately 
10,271). 
b) In the Irvin case it was noted that the press 
attempted to excuse defense counsel for its action in 
defending the accused because the attorney would be 
disbarred if he didn't. In the case at bar it can be 
argued that Judge Day was attempting to exoneratt 
defense counsel from its participation in an unpopular 
cause, when he commented on them as being court ap-
pointed (Tr. 194). 
c) In the Irvin case the court excused 268 persons 
out of 430, as having fixed opinions as to the guilt of 
petitioner. In the case at bar a total of 51 persons were 
called as veniremen, and of those 51, 9 were excused 
on grounds of being biased or prejudiced. 'Vhile in the 
case at bar there was not as large a percentage it would 
seem that 17. 7 % is still extreme. Particularly where a 
more probing voir dire may have caused more to be 
excused. 
d) Many of the comments made by the prospectiYe 
jurors in Irvin were very similar to comments made 
by prospective jurors in this trial, i.e.; "Could not ... 
give the defendant the benefit of the doubt that he is 
innocent" Irvin v. Dowd, at p. 728. In this case (Tr. 
124) the jurors admitted it would be up to the defense 
to change their minds. Also in Irvin v. Dowd, at p. 728, 
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there was the comment "You can't forget what you 
hear and see." Whereas, in this case (Tr. 28) when 
askt>d about preconceived opinions affecting his judg-
ment a juror commented "It is bound to, what I have 
heard.'' 
As recognized by the court in Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 
it is very questionable that such a thing as "absolute 
nnpartiality" does in fact exist, and if such a standard 
were strictly required by the courts in selecting a jury 
it is possible that a jury would never be seated. There-
fore, we examine each prospective juror to determine 
whether or not the accused would get a fair hearing 
based upon that juror's response to the various ques-
tions asked of him, and if he responds satisfactorlly 
he cannot be challenged for cause. This does not mean 
that that juror does not contain some hidden or sub-
conscious bias or prejudice. Such a state of subdued 
bias or prejudice may not really be too harmful to 
au accused if it is only present in one or two jurors, 
or if possibly off-set by similar bias or prejudice 
of other jurors in favor of the accused. However, if 
there is reasonable grounds to believe that there is a 
state of subdued bias and prejudice in all or most of 
the jurors such bias and prejudice may come to the 
surface when the members of the jury collectively begin 
their deliberation. 
In the rather exact field of mathematics it may 
he true that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, 
hut in the subjective field of human nature that equa-
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tion may not be true, and the collective action of the 
group may certainly exceed the action which may han 
been taken by any individual member of that group. 
Admittedlv in small towns there is alwa''S '"Oill" .J :r b C1 
to be a problem of selecting a jury that is completely 
unfamiliar with the parties, counsel and witnesses, 
and as a practical matter it might be impossible 
But when the inter-relationships between the jurors 
and the parties, witnesses and counsel are as pro-
nounced as they are in the case at bar, involving frien<ls. 
neighbors and close relatives, it seems highly unlikely 
that those relationships would not have a pronounced 
effect on the deliberations of the jury. 
In connection with this community inter-relation-
ship, it is of the utmost importance to recognize hrn 
additional facts. First, the appellant was a relatiye 
stranger to St. George, so the community feelings 
which existed were in opposition to him. Second, it must 
be recognized that the appellant was on trial for his 
life, and where it may be deemed a necessary expe<lic11t 
to allow small town juries to decide local controwrsie~ 
between local citizens, we should not allow a yirtu:1l 
stranger to be tried for his life in a community when 
the person killed was a life-time resident of that com-
munity and where the prospective jurors expressed 
prejudice and unwillingness to accord the accuse<l the 
basic protections of due process of law. 
In a recent New Jersey case, State v . .J acl.·snn, J:J 
N.J. HS, 203 A 2d l, ( 19G4), that l'.ourt reversed and 
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remanded for new trial a first degree murder con-
yid10n. The court found error committed by the trial 
court when it refused to dismiss a juror who had been 
challenged for cause. The cause for dismissal, as argued 
by defense counsel, was that the juror could not be con-
sidered fair and impartial because he was a close friend 
of a detective who was a witness for the prosecution. 
In support of its decision the court discussed several 
other cases where the impartiality of jurors was in ques-
tion. One of the cases discussed was U.S. v. Chapman, 
158 F. 2d 417 (IO Cir.1946), wherein that court said: 
"A juror's answer to questions touching his 
state of mind is primary evidence of his compe-
tency but the ultimate question is a judicial one 
for the court to decide, and in case of doubt, 
justice demands that the challenge be allowed 
.... Only by a punctilious regard for a suspicion 
of prejudice can we hope to maintain the high 
traditions of our jury system. 'Ve must make 
sure that the lamentations of the unsuccessful 
litigant is without foundation, either in fact or 
circumstances." 1.58 F. 2d at p. 421. 
The New Jersey Court also stated: 
"The jurors must be carefu1ly selected with 
an eye towards their ability to determine the con-
troyerted issue fairly and impartially; in the 
words of Justice Blandin in State v. 'Vhite, 105 
N.H. 159, 196 A 2d. 33, 34 (1963), the trial 
court should see to it that the jury is as nearly 
impartial 'as the lot of humanity will admit'." 
In reading the opinion of the New Jersey court, 
and the related cases upon which that court relied, it 
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is evident that the primary concern of the judges 
was that it is absolutely necessary to keep the jury 
above suspicion by keeping it free from the appear-
ance of prejudice. This very fundamental concept 
of having a jury free from suspicion is a concept whid1 
the Utah Supreme Court has given its full support. 
State v. Crank, supra. This case has already been dis-
cussed in connection with Point I of appellant's brief, 
and in this connection we refer back to the quotation 
from that case which was set out at page 23 infra. Li 
State v. Crank, this court was concerned with the poten-
tial danger which may have arisen out of a conversation 
known to have taken place between a witness and one 
juror. In this case we are concerned about the potential 
danger which arose because most of the jurors were 
friends, relatives or acquaintances of the witnesses, 
the prosecuting attorneys and the victim. The prob-
lems are essentially the same and the opinion of this 
court in State v. Crank, snpra, should demand that 
this case should be remanded for a new trial. 
POINT Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION BY ADl\IITTING INTO EYI-
DENCE GRUESOl\IE AND GORY COLORED 
PHOTOGRAPHIC SLIDES OF THE AUTOP-
SY PERFORNIED ON THE DECEASED 
'VHEN THE INFLAMl\IA'l'ORY N ATVHE 
AND PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF SUCH 
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1 PHOTOGRAPHS OVER-SHADOWED ANY 
POSSIBLE PROBATIVE VALUE WITH RE-
SPECT TO A FACT IN ISSUE. 
Y\Then photographs and color autopsy slides are 
offered into evidence for a demonstration to the jury, 
their admissibility depends upon whether they are rele-
yant and probative with respect to a fact in issue, and 
1d1ether that probative value outweighs the danger 
of prejudice to the defendant. Oxidine v. State, 335 
P. 2d 940 (Okla. 1958) ; People v. Burm, 109 C.A. 
2d 524, 241 P. 2d 308 (1952); People v. Redston, 139 
C.A. 2d 485, 293 P. 2d 880 (1956); State v. Russell, 
IOG Utah ll6, 145 P. 2d 1003 (1944), reversing a mur-
der conviction on other grounds. 
"The general rule is that, 'Where the inevit-
able effect of introducing a photograph is to 
arouse the sympathy or prejudice of the jury, 
and the fact in proof of which it is offered is 
not denied, or where the introduction serves no 
purpose other than to inflame the jurors' emo-
tions, it is not admissible'." People v. Redston, 
supra, at 883, 884. 
If the probative value of photo slides with respect 
to a fact in issue outweighs the danger of prejudice 
against the defendant, then they are admissible. People 
v. Harrison, 30 Cal. Rptr, 841, 381 P. 2d 665, 668 
(1963). 
It is initially within the sound discretion of the 
t ria I eourt to apply these tests to determine whether 
the inflammatory nature of the slides is outweighed 
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by their probative value with respect to a fact in issue. 
People v. Burns, supra; People v. "flarirson, supra. 
However, it is an abuse of discretion to allow 
autopsy pictures of an iufiammatory nature into eYi-
dence when there is no issue or controversy as to the 
cause of death. O.cidine v. State, supra. 
In People v. Burns, supra, at pages 318, 319, a 
murder trial, three photographs of the deceased were 
admitted into evidence. They were pictures of the 
face, neck and torso taken after the autopsy. They 
showed the deceased with his head shaved and with 
several surgical cuts and incisions which had been made 
for the autopsy. They were offered to depict the i11-
juries which were inflicted. But no one ever disputed 
that the deceased received them. The court could nut 
see how the pictures could be used for any purpose 
other than to influence the jurors' emotions against the 
defendant. The court went on to hold that: 
" ... there is a dividing line between admitting 
a photograph which is of some help to the jury 
in solving the facts of the case and one which is 
of no value other than to inflame the minds of the 
jurors. This line was crossed in this case." Id. at 
319. 
In reversing and remanding a manslaughter con-
viction the court in People v. Rerlston, supra, on pages 
888, 889, held that it was an abuse of discretion to allow 
pictures taken during an autopsy to be aclmitted in 
the trial court. The first photograph complained of 
was of the deceased "showing certain incision 011 the 
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head ... apparently made during the autopsy." The 
second "was a picture of the upper part of the skull, 
after the same had been removed with an electric saw," 
and the third picture was of the "base of the skull after 
top had been sawed off and removed." 
The court recognized that admission of these photo-
graphs was within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. But there was never any question as to the 
identity of the deceased and there was no question as 
to the death. Thus, there was no purpose served by 
the admission of the photographs other than to inflame 
the jurors' emotions. Therefore, the discretion of the 
trial court was held to have been abused when it ad-
mitted them. The fact that the defense counsel's 
objection, after the court admitted the photographs, 
was on the ground that they speak for themselves did 
not waive the error. 
In the instant case, seven gruesome color slides 
were introduced at the trial in addition to many other 
black and white photos of the deceased. These exhibits 
were displayed through a slide projector to the jury. 
They could have aroused the jury's passion against the 
defendant. State's exhibit No. 19 is a picture of the 
face, neck and shoulders of the deceased before the 
doctor cleaned the blood from his face. Other black 
and white photos showing the position and wounds of 
the deceased when found by his brother had already 
been introduced. 
A second slide, State's exhibit No. 25, depicted the 
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deceased's head in a slightly elevated position. It is 
a gruesome showing of the base of the skull after the 
skull cap and brain were renrn1·ed by the pathologist. 
The skin is peeled over the edge of the skull showing 
the empty brain cavity. A third exhibit, No. 2-1!, 
is a top Yiew of the "inner aspect of the cranial cavity'' 
(Tr. 439). The scalp is refiected over the head of the 
deceased. The top of the skull and brain are removed 
exposing the empty cavity. Four other gruesome slides 
of the autopsy were also displayed. 
The showing of each of these slides was accompanied 
by a narrative from the pathologist who performed the 
autopsy. The essence of his testimony was that the de-
ceased was shot twice in the head. There was never any 
question of the deceased's death or its cause. No one 
questioned the identity of the deceased. Thus, there was 
no fact in issue that these pictures would help the jury 
solve. They only display the handiwork of the autopsy 
pathologist. 
They were certainly of an inflammatory nature 
and thus prejudicial. "Then the slides are examined 
as to their probative value the latter is negligible or 
non-existent; and, it is overshadowed by the prejudi-
cial effect they would have on the jurors' emotions. 
Therefore, even though the trial court had the discretion 
to determine their admissibilty when it applied the test 
to these photographs, it abused that discretion and 
committed a prejudicial error to the defendant. Cer-
tainly, in a case where the jury had the opportunity to 
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rccoinmend leniency in order to avoid the death penalty, 
pidures of the nature introduced in exhibits 19-25, 
!iaYiug no relevance to matters not otherwise proved, 
could only have inflamed the jury. Defense counsel 
objected to their admission (Tr. 429), but still the 
court allowed them to be viewed by the jury. Such 
action was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial. 
Numerous courts have so ruled in comparable cases and 
reversed convictions. 
In People v. Burns, supra, the court reversed a 
murder conviction because the defendant was denied 
a fair trial. The autopsy photographs were held to have 
been introduced only to influence the emotions of the 
jury against the defendant. People v. Redston, supra, 
a murder conviction was reversed because the photo-
graphs of the autopsy had no value other than to in-
tlame the minds of the jurors. Thus, it was an abuse 
of discretion for the trial judge to admit them. 
In 0.ridine v. State, supra, the court reversed and 
remanded a murder conviction for a new trial. The 
eourt held that where there was no issue or controversy 
as to the cause of death, which was due to certain bullet 
wounds, nor was there any controversy as to the loca-
tion of the wounds, showing of colored slides on a 
screen to the jury taken during the autopsy was preju-
dicial error since they were a mere appeal to the emo-
tions and passions of the jury. 
This court should reverse. 
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POINT IY 
THE TRIAL COURT C01-\L\UTTED PUE.J-
UDICIAL EHROR BY CO,\l.i'.IENTING OX 
THE CREDIBILITY OI,-. A PROSECCTIOX 
"YVITNESS IN SUCH i\ l\IANNER 1\S TO 
BOLSTER HIS TESTil\IONY BEFORE THE 
JURY. 
This court has enumerated the general rule that: 
"In this jurisdiction the trial judge is not 
permitted to comment on the evidence. It is the 
sole awl exclusive province of the jury to de-
termine the facts in all criminal cases, whether 
the evidence is weak or strong, is in conflict or 
is not controverted." State v. Green, 78 Utah 
580, 6 P. 2d 177, 181 (rnBl); accord, State Y. 
Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P. 2d 284 (1953). 
Although a judge may ask proper and pertinent 
questions, there is no rule which allows him to intimate 
his opinion as to the credibility of any witness. Brennin 
v. State, 375 P. 2d 276 (Okla. Cr. 1962) ; State v. 
Harris, supra : 
"In the minds of the jurors it places the judge 
in a hostile attitude toward the defendant and 
discredits any defense that he might offer .... 
No judge ha~ the right ... to indicate his opinion 
as to the credibility of any witness examined." 
Brennin v. State, supra at page 280. 
If the trial judge comments on the credibility of 
any witness, it is prejudicial error which requires a 
reversal. People v. Frank, 71 Cal. App. 575, 23ti Pac. 
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189 ( 1925) ; People v. Ramirez, 113 Cal. App. 2d 842, 
2.J.9 P.2d 307 ( 1952) ; State v. Green, supra. 
in the instant case, defense counsel during cross-
examination of the last of the State's witnesses, Delton 
ll.ay Nance, asked if he had ever been placed on proba-
tion. The court answered in the affirmative (Tr. 723, 
72.J.). Then the witness indicated that he was placed on 
probation the preceding December (Tr. 724). The 
proseeution then conducted a brief redirect examination 
(Tr. 724) . After both defense counsel and the prosecu-
tion indicated that they had nothing further to ask the 
witness, the court then commenced to vouch for the 
yeracity of Nance, as well as add remarks to the record 
which were exclusively from his own knowledge (Tr. 
726): 
"I am the judge who placed Mr. Nance on 
probation, and I placed him on probation I don't 
remember when but some months ago under the 
supervision and direction of the Adult Proba-
tion and Parole Department of the State of 
Utah. Mr. Alan Keller is the agent of that 
office ... I know Mr. Keller requires probation-
ers to report to the Sheriff's Office ... and have 
them co-sign their monthly reports each month; 
and I assume while Mr. Nance was in 'Vashing-
ton County he reported to the Sheriff's office 
here for that purpose (Tr. 726) . " 
These unsolicited comments certainly would create 
an impression, in the minds of the jury, as to the judge's 
opinion of the credibility of the witness. Since it is in 
t!ic f'xel11sive province of the .iury to determine such 
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credibility, the trial judge usurped their function. The 
comment was crucial because Nance was a "j ailhouse ., 
witness who supposedly heard appellant make what 
could be considered an admission of the crime. lleiurr 
0 
a jailbird, Nance's credibility was in doubt and the 
judge's comments bolstered Nance's credibility. Thm 
the comments were clearly prejudicial in this case. I 
People v. Frank, supra; State v. Green, supra. : 
Even when the "trial judge unintentionally in<li-
cates that the witness is worthy of belief," it is error. 
1 
Koontz v. State, 10 Okla. 553, 139 Pac. 842, 845 ( 19H); · 
People v. Franli:, supra. 
"Under our system of criminal jurisprudence, i 
the jury are the exclusive judges of the weight 
and credibility to be given the testimony of a 
witness. 
"The courts cannot legally indicate their opin-
ion either expressly or impliedly, intentionally 
or otherwise, as to the credibility of any witness 
... [T)he whole matter ... must be left to the 
jury." Holcomb v. State, 950 Ok. Cr. 55, 239 
P. 2d 806, 810, 811 ( 1952). 
Thus, it is not the intent of the trial judge that is 
controlling. The primary factor is to determine what the 
effect of the comments will likely be on the jury. If the 
effect of the comments was to prejudice defendant's 
case in the eyes of the jury, he cannot be said to ha Ye 
had a fair trial. PeoJJle t'. lluff, 134 Cal. App. 2d 187. 
285 P.2d 17, 20 ( 1955). 
In People 1'. Ramire::.:, supra, the court reversed 
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a narcotics emwiction because the trial judge commented 
on the credibility of a state's witness: 
"[The judge] should not express an opm10n 
as to the credibility of a witness . . . for the 
jury are the sole judges of the facts, and the 
credibility of witnesses." People v. Ramirez, 
supra at page 315; accord, State v. Green, supra. 
This court indicated that if the trial judge volun-
teered information about a prior proceeding before him 
in which the defendant had a substantial connection, it 
would he grounds for a mistrial. State v. Musser, no 
Utah 534, 17 5 P .2d 724, 738 ( 1946). In the instant case, 
the trial judge stated that the witness had been before 
1 him in a prior proceeding (Tr. 726), and then he volun-
teered a detailed account of the disposition of that earlier 
case; and gave his own version of what he assumed the 
witness had done subsequently (Tr. 726). This conduct 
could definitely create an impression on the jurors that 
the judge felt that Mr. Nance's testimony was worthy 
of belief. See Koontz v. State, supra. The trial judge, 
by stating he placed the witness on probation, lends 
support for the conclusion that the judge thought he 
was a good probation risk and therefore a reasonably 
credible person. Thus the effect of the judge's testimony 
was to strengthen the prosecution's case in the minds of 
the jurors. People v. Frank, supra; State v. Green, 
supra. The judgment of the lower court should be re-
W'l"sed and defendant granted a new trial, State v. 
u,.een' supra. 
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POINT V 
THE CUl\IULATIVE EFFECT OF THE 
FOREGOING EHRORS DEPIU\'ED THE AP-
PELL.A.KT OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
Each of the foregoing issues presents suff icie11t 
ground upon which this court could reverse the trial 
court judgment and grant the appellant a new trial. 
However, should the court hold against the appellant on 
each of these issues there is a self-imposed duty upon 
this court to "scrutinize with care the propriety of all 
aspects of the proceeding." State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2<l 
230, 243, 282 P.2d 323 ( 1955). 
It has been recognized by this court that there may 
be several errors in a trial, and each error stauding 
alone will not be sufficiently prejudicial to merit a 
reversal, but when each error is viewed in conj unction I 
with the other errors the cumulative effect may amount 
to the denial of a fair trial. State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 
444, 454, 121 Pac. 903 ( 1942). This position was re-
affirmed in a relatively recent opinion of this court in 
State v. St. Clair, supra at 243: 
"It is recognized that a combination of errors 
which, when singly considered might be thought 
insufficient to warrant a reversal, might in their 
cumulative effect do so. 1'his is particularl.11 so 
where any difference in the verdict, even a recom-
11Zendation of leniency, would make the diff cr-
ence between life and death to the nccused." 
(Emphasis added) . 
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In light of the above, a brief review of the record 
\\'ill show the alleged errors when examined as to their 
cumtilative effect prevented the appellant from receiving 
a fair trial. 
The crime was committed in a relatively small rural 
community, and the nature of the crime was such as to 
create a great deal of community interest. Needless to 
say, the crime of murder is not an everyday occurrence 
in a town the size of St. George. In addition to a being 
a spectacular crime in a small community, the victim 
of the crime was a life time resident of that community. 
:'.\Ir. Hall was known by almost everyone who had any-
thing to do with the trial, whereas the defendant was 
known by very few people in St. George. The defendant 
haJ. only been in the town for a few months, and appar-
ently had no friends that were willing to testify on his 
' behalf or to assist him in any way. 
There had developed a community attitude about 
Mr. Poe both prior to the crime and between the crime 
and the trial. One of the most revealing factors as to 
the community attitude was reflected in the severity of 
the sentence. A close examination of the trial record 
will show that the verdict of guilty was based solely 
upon circumstantial evidence. The state did not prove 
the rifle in question was the murder weapon, they did 
not prove the money spent by Mr. Poe for gas was taken 
from l\Ir. Hall's wallet, they did not prove with any 
certainty the time of death. Admittedly there was cir-
1·11mstantial evidence upon which the jurors could draw 
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inferences, but there was also a lack of absolute proof. j 
The crime was not unusual as murders go. Under these 1 
circumstances the failure of the jury to make a recom- I 
mendation of leniency is certainly evidence of the pre-
judicial impact of the factors argued in this brief on tlie 
Jurors. 
The inter-relationships that existed among the I 
jurors as friends, neighbors and relatives could give rise 
1 
to a multitude of unforeseeable consequences. "rheu 
such a group of people are allowed to determine the life 
1 
or death of a stranger to their community the utmost' 
of care should be taken. llut when these jurors, most: 
of whom were personally acquainted with the victim. 
were allowed to view the color pictures of the autopsy. I 
when those pictures could serve no purpose other than 
to incite the emotions of a group of people who were 
already emotionally involved, any changes of a fair trial 
were at that point eliminated. 
The additional factor of allowing Sheriff 'Vhitc-
head to act as bailiff, was just one more step in the 
process of erroneously allowing an intermingling of 
members of the community to the detriment of the 
defendant. 
From a community standpoint the defendant had 
all the cards stacked against him. He did not even hare 
the advantage of making a respectable physical appear-
ance during the trial. His appearing in levis, boots. a 
plaid shirt and a beard could not possibly have be11e-
fited him. 
48 
It is submitted, therefore that under the rule of 
the St. Clair case this court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Attorney for Appellant 
Salt Lake County Bar Legal Services 
431 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
49 
